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Abstract
This article analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and international trade.
We ﬁrst show that trade destruction due to civil wars is very large and persistent and increases
with the severity of the conﬂict. We then identify two effects that trade can have on the risk
of civil conﬂicts: It may act as a deterrent if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars, but it
may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during
civil wars. We ﬁnd support for the presence of these two mechanisms and conclude that trade
openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade)
but may increase the risk of lower-scale conﬂicts. (JEL: F10, F51, F52, F59)
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, democratization and increased integration in
the world economy have often been advocated in order to promote prosperity
and peace in poor countries. In this article, we focus on the relation between
international trade and civil wars, an endemic form of violence in poor countries
(see Collier and Rohner 2008 for an analysis of the effect of democracy on the
risk of civil wars). We identify two possible mechanisms relating international
trade and civil wars: deterrence and insurance. Whereas the ﬁrst effect is such that
trade openness lowers the risk of civil wars, the second one works in the opposite
direction.
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Our hypothesis is the following. Because civil wars destroy international
trade, some of the economic gains generated by trade are put at risk for all
groups (rebels and government) involved so that the opportunity cost of conﬂict
increases with observed trade ﬂows. From this point of view, a larger openness
to international trade should act as a deterrent to escalation towards civil con-
ﬂicts. However, international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during
civil wars as it provides alternative sources of income and consumption. From
this point of view, it can act as an insurance and can reduce the opportunity
cost of civil war. Another way to state this argument is that international trade
can weaken economic ties and dependence between groups and regions inside a
country as trade with foreign countries can become a substitute to internal trade.
This reduced dependence decreases the opportunity cost of conﬂicts. This line
of reasoning resembles the one made in an earlier report (Martin, Mayer, and
Thoenig [forthcoming]) showing that multilateral trade openness increases the
probability of a bilateral conﬂict between countries. In that paper, we showed
that violence can arise between two parties because of failure to avert escala-
tion of a dispute on how to appropriate a surplus. In the presence of asymmetric
information, for example on the military or political strength of the two par-
ties, the escalation is possible and depends on the opportunity cost of a violent
conﬂict for both parties. A higher opportunity cost increases the incentive to
make concessions in order to avert escalation. Our hypothesis in the present arti-
cle is that international trade can affect the opportunity cost of civil conﬂicts
through both deterrence and insurance effects. In order to test for the existence
of these two mechanisms, we ﬁrst check that more intense conﬂicts destroy more
trade. Hence, the deterrence effect should be more important for those con-
ﬂicts. Also, the insurance effect is weaker for those conﬂicts. At the extreme,
the insurance effect disappears if all international trade is destroyed during civil
wars.
The initial motivation for civil war as well as its ﬁnancial feasibility may also
be related to international trade. This argument has been made for commodity
exports by Collier and Hoefﬂer (2007) and Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Rohner (2007)
and discussed critically by Fearon (2005). Higher primary commodity exports can
provide opportunities for predation by rebel groups and therefore help ﬁnance the
rebellion. They can also constitute a motivation for rebel groups to capture the
rent. The rent extorted from natural resources is most valuable to the extent that
it can be exported. Given that this channel has been extensively studied in the
literature we do not focus on it, but we control for the share of primary exports
over GDP in all our regressions so as to check that the deterrence and insurance
effects of trade openness on the probability of civil war do not follow from this
feasibility and motivation effect.
In political science, several recent reports (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005;
Bussmann and de Soysa 2005; Bussmann and Schneider 2007) report a negative
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correlation between trade openness and the risk of civil war. These studies do
not, however, take into account the issue of reverse causality. A clear problem is
that the negative correlation may be due to the fact that civil wars durably destroy
trade—something we indeed show and quantify. Hence, a methodological objec-
tive of this article is to attempt to solve this reverse causality issue with the use
of instruments. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the data used, and Section 3 presents
our results on the empirical relation between trade and civil conﬂicts. Section 4
concludes.
2. Data
The data used in this article combine several statistical sources. For civil wars,
we mainly use the Correlates of War source, and more precisely the expanded
version provided by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch1 and detailed in Gleditsch (2004).
This data set also allows us to detect the most intense conﬂicts by providing indi-
cation of the number of battle deaths involved. The median of this ﬁgure in the
data set, when positive, is 30,000. We deﬁne an intense civil war as involving
more than 50,000 casualties. Our typical sample includes all countries avail-
able in the civil war data set over the 1945–2001 period, where information
for right-hand-side variables (in particular trade) is available. Column (4) of
Table 1, for instance, has 4,356 observations, of which 4,040 exhibit no civil
war, 316 (7.2%) have a civil war, and 119 have an intense one. For robustness
purposes, we also use the expanded version of the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Con-
ﬂict Dataset, used by Gates and Strand (2004). Regarding intensity, the PRIO
data set is not as precise and only reports when the number of battle deaths is
higher than 1,000 which we use as our indicator of intensity. The PRIO data
set classiﬁes many more events as civil wars. In column (7), the 4,356 obser-
vations have 768 (17.6%) civil wars, of which 593 have more than 1,000 battle
deaths.
Other data come from standard sources: Trade uses IMF DOTS data, aug-
mented as in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (forthcoming). GDP and population
data come mostly from World Bank WDI, completed by Barbieri (2002). Primary
exports ratios are constructed from the trade dataset of Robert Feenstra.2 Democ-
racy comes from the Polity IV project. Ethnic fractionalization comes from
Alesina’s Web site. All gravity-related variables come from the CEPII database.
1. <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/∼ksg/expwar.html>.
2. As our deﬁnition of primary products, we take what has been standard in the literature: food,
beverages, crude materials, fuels, and nonferrous metals. We add SITC 667, which lists all precious
stones, pearls, and so on.
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3. Results
3.1. The Effect of Civil Wars on International Trade
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to quantify the size and persistence of the destruc-
tion of international trade by civil wars. We do this in a very standard fashion by
estimating gravity equations which measure increases in trade costs (related to
infrastructure, rule of law, information, trust, etc.) due to a civil war. Note that
this effect comes in addition to the impact civil wars have on trade through their
negative impact on income.3
Left in the equation to be estimated is an exporter GDP term, and a vec-
tor of the traditional proxies for trade costs, all expressed relative to the United
States. The list of proxies for trade costs include bilateral distance, contiguity,
colonial linkages, a dummy indicating whether one country has a communist
regime, common membership in a regional trade area, and a variable counting
the number of GATT/WTO member in the country pair. To this list we add lags
and leads of dummies indicating the occurrence of a civil war in the import-
ing or the exporting country. Coefﬁcients on those dummies measure the trade
(exports and imports) impact of such conﬂicts and the persistence of this impact
over time.
Detailed results are available upon request, and results on usual variables
are very similar to usual ﬁndings, with, for instance, a near unitary coefﬁcient
on incomes, a coefﬁcient near −1 for distance, and a positive impact of regional
agreements. For the sake of clarity we choose a graphical representation of our
results of interest. Figure 1 shows, using this regression, the fall in trade after a
civil war relative to “natural” (i.e., gravity-predicted) trade with 10% conﬁdence
intervals in bands (the coefﬁcients are smoothed using a two-year window around
the year of interest). The gray squares represent the impact of the most intense
civil wars (the ones with reported casualties over 50,000 deaths), and the black
triangles represent the impact of less severe crises.
The effect of a severe civil war is both very large on contemporaneous
trade and very persistent: We observe a fall in trade around 25% from its nat-
ural level in the ﬁrst year of the conﬂict. This controls for the level of GDP
3. As emphasized by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), all theoretical foundations of the grav-
ity equation predict bilateral trade ﬂows to be a function of trade partners’ incomes and bilateral
trade impediments, but also of what they call “multilateral resistance terms,” a complex function of
incomes and trade costs of all trade partners in a given year. Omitting those terms biases the esti-
mates of changes in trade costs of the type we want to measure. As in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig
(forthcoming) and Romalis (2007), we use a convenient feature of CES demand functions that makes
relative imports from a given exporter independent of the characteristics of third countries. Multi-
lateral resistance terms are eliminated in the bilateral trade equation by choosing the imports from
the United States as a benchmark of comparison for all imports of each importing country. It also
eliminates the GDP term of the importing country.
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Figure 1. The impact of civil wars on trade.
(which typically also falls during civil wars) so that the total fall in trade is actu-
ally larger. The destruction of trade becomes larger with time and is extremely
persistent as it is still present at around 40% 25 years after the conﬂict’s onset.
This is in contrast with interstate wars where the effect is large when looking
at bilateral trade between the two belligerents but is not as persistent and is
very small for multilateral trade of two belligerents (Blomberg and Hess 2006;
Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig [forthcoming]). For less-severe conﬂicts, the effect
is smaller but still present and persistent. It, however, disappears after around 20
years. Interestingly, the fall in trade anticipates the onset of the civil war. Many
explanations can be given to this ﬁnding but it points clearly to an endogeneity
issue in previous empirical studies that have found a negative impact of trade
on the risk of civil wars (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; Bussmann and de Soysa
2005).
3.2. The Impact of Trade Openness on the Risk of Civil War
We now analyze the impact of trade openness on the probability of civil war and
attempt to identify the two effects we discussed in the Introduction: deterrence
and insurance. Because the deterrence effect depends positively on the expected
destruction of trade, we can infer from the previous section results that deterrence
is stronger in the case of the most-severe civil wars. Hence our empirical strategy
consists in disentangling the deterrence and insurance effects by comparing the
differential effect of trade openness on low- versus high-intensity civil wars. We
estimate the probability of a civil war in country i at time t with the following
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regression:
Pr(warit) = γ0 + γ1controlsit +
(
γ2 + γ3intensityit
)× ln


R∑
j =i
mijt
Eit

 , (1)
where
∑R
j =i mijt/Eit represents multilateral import ﬂows as ratios of income and
intensityit is a dummy variable equal to one for high-intensity civil wars. The
presence of an insurance mechanism in trade is consistent with a positive impact
of trade on the probability of civil war so we expect γ2 > 0. The presence of a
deterrence effect is identiﬁed by a negative effect of trade openness on the wars
that are most destructive in terms of trade, that is, the high-intensity wars. Hence,
we expect: γ3 < 0.
Table 1 shows both the pooled results (ﬁrst two columns) and the ﬁxed effects
results (last six columns). The interaction termγ3 featuring in equation (1) is tested
in regressions (5) to (8).
In regressions (1) to (4), we replicate some of the results obtained in the
existing literature. In regression (1), we use a logit speciﬁcation predicting the
onset of civil wars for the 1960–1999 period. We introduce a number of standard
controls: The number of peaceful years (since the last civil war); the growth rate
of the country at time t − 2, the log of the GDP per capita at t − 1, the log
of population at time t − 1, the log of the share of primary exports in GDP,
the index of democracy and its squared value, and ﬁnally an index of ethnic
fractionalization. In all regressions, decade ﬁxed effects are added.4 The ﬁrst
two columns therefore pool a very large number of countries over roughly half a
century each. The error term is thus likely to exhibit correlation patterns for a given
country, and we cluster the (robust) standard errors at the country level to take this
into account. The controls have the usual sign (see Fearon 2005 for a comparable
speciﬁcation) but their signiﬁcance is lower than in the existing literature because
of clustered standard errors. In this ﬁrst regression, the correlation between the
probability of civil war and trade openness is negative and very signiﬁcant as in
the existing literature. However, this coefﬁcient is difﬁcult to interpret due to the
reverse causality issue discussed in the previous section. The second regression
has similar results for a logit equation that has all years of civil wars (and not only
the onset of it). From regression (3), we systematically introduce country ﬁxed
effects in our speciﬁcations.5 In the logit version of column (3), the identiﬁcation
of the country ﬁxed effects is made only within countries that experienced a
civil war at some point in our time frame: This means that all countries that
never experienced a civil war are dropped from the sample. We thus choose to
4. The introduction of ﬁve-year ﬁxed effects does not change the results qualitatively. Year ﬁxed
effects leave signs unchanged but reduce the signiﬁcance of some coefﬁcients.
5. In this case, ethnic fractionalization which is not time varying is dropped.
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switch to OLS regressions with ﬁxed effects as this less stringent speciﬁcation
allows to retain all observations. As shown in column (4), the OLS results are
very similar to the logit ones: In both cases trade openness is not signiﬁcant
and, for the other covariates, the direction and the signiﬁcance of the effects are
similar.
Starting with regression (5), equation 1 is tested and we attempt to identify
the two effects of trade openness by introducing an interaction term between trade
openness and the intensity of the civil war. The results are consistent with our
hypothesis that trade openness affects the probability of a civil war through both
an insurance and a deterrence effect. For low-intensity civil wars, trade openness
increases the probability of a civil war. However, for high-intensity ones, trade
openness reduces the risk of civil war as the coefﬁcient on the interacted term
is larger (in absolute value) than the non-interacted one. In regression (5), the
hypothesis is tested with a ﬁxed effects OLS speciﬁcation. Both coefﬁcients are
signiﬁcant and of the right sign. We have checked that using only observations
for the onset of civil wars gives similar results. A possible alternative explanation
of the positive sign on trade openness is that it helps ﬁnance or motivate the
rebellion. Remember, however, that we control for the share of primary exports
in GDP. Hence, this suggests that the positive sign on trade openness for low
intensity conﬂicts does not come from the fact that higher exports of primary
commodities facilitate the ﬁnancing of rebellion.
In regression (6), we attempt to solve the endogeneity issue by using instru-
mental variables. Given that we have two endogenous variables (trade and trade
interacted with war intensity), we need to use at least two instrumental variables.
We choose the log of remoteness of the country and a dummy for membership
of the country in GATT/WTO. Both variables are lagged two years so as to give
them time to affect trade openness. The remoteness variable is routinely used in
the international trade literature as one of the determinants of trade ﬂows (see
Baier and Bergstrand 2004) and as an instrument for trade openness. Intuitively,
remoteness measures each importer’s set of alternative trade partners. A country
with low remoteness has many nearby and large alternative sources of goods and
increases its multilateral imports and is therefore more open to trade. Following
the literature, our deﬁnition of the remoteness variable is
remotenessit = − ln


R∑
j =i
GDPjt/dij

 ,
where dij is bilateral distance between i and j . The main interest of the remote-
ness variable is that it varies in the time dimension for a given country i—this is
a key feature given that our regressions include country ﬁxed effects. First-stage
regressions (unreported due to space constraints but available upon request) show
that our two instruments have the expected effects on trade openness (negative
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for remoteness and positive for GATT/WTO membership) for both the COW
and PRIO data sets. The F -test statistics lie around 80, indicating very powerful
instruments. Unsurprisingly, the instruments are weaker when explaining trade
openness interacted with civil war intensity. In fact, only GATT/WTO member-
ship seems a signiﬁcant covariate in this case, strongly for the COW civil wars,
weaker in the case of PRIO.
Regression (6) is our preferred speciﬁcation (instrumental variables, country
ﬁxed effects, decade ﬁxed effects). The two coefﬁcients of interest, γ2 and γ3
in equation (1), have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In
regressions (7) and (8), we check whether our results also hold when we use the
PRIO data set. Broadly, the results are conﬁrmed. However, in the speciﬁcation
with instrumental variables (regression 8), the interaction term, although it has
the right sign, is not signiﬁcant. This is very likely to come from the fact that in
this data set, none of our instruments is very strong for the interaction term.
4. Conclusion
We ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that trade openness of a country affects its
risk of civil war. Trade openness increases the risk of low intensity conﬂicts but
decreases the risk of high-intensity conﬂicts. We interpret this result as evidence
that international trade affects the risk of civil war through two mechanisms that
play in opposite direction: insurance and deterrence.
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